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Abstract 
Politics is central to development discourse, yet remains peripheral. And, over 
some twenty years, a civil society narrative has not fulfilled its potential to 
‘bring politics back in’. Reasons can be found in conceptual confusion, in 
selectivity in donor thinking and policies towards civil society and in the 
growth-driven political economy of NGO-ism. Remedies for the political 
lacunae are being sought through a focus on rights, citizenship and leadership 
that show valuable, focused progress. This paper examines a comprehensive 
complement to such efforts referred to as civic driven change (CDC). Originating 
in a grounded empirical approach, the constituent principles and elements of 
CDC offer a lens that can both sharpen and deepen insights and advance 
analysis of socio-political processes. As a work in progress, a CDC narrative is 
illustrated by reference to contemporary examples of citizen action that play 
out at multiple sites of governance. 
Keywords 
Civil society; Civic Driven Change; Citizenship; Institutional sectors; Power; 
Civic agency; Empowerment; Micro-politics 
 5
Civic driven change1 
A narrative to bring politics back into civil society discourse 
1 Introduction 
The insertion of ‘civil society’ into development debate has not lived up to 
expectations. The concepts’ theoretical provenance offered an opportunity to 
respond to an oft repeated call to ‘bring politics back in’ to an essential 
position within aided development thinking and practice (e.g., Berntzen and 
Selle; 1990; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2002; Hickey, 2009).2  Some twenty years of 
experience shows that selective variations of the concept have been deployed 
by western governments in support of a utilitarian interpretation and agenda 
propagating western universalism. The international aid system has been one 
important mechanism for doing so. Since the early nine-teen nineties, for 
official development agencies, a shift of policy perspectives from 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in a ‘third sector’ to civil society as a 
political category offered an opportunity to re-think development in terms of 
the evolution of power relations between a state and the polity. It also offered 
a messy empirical category that could politically inform the conditionality of 
aid funding. Yet, over this period, civil society discourse has not managed to 
“… establish politics as a central concern within development studies …” 
(Hickey, 2009:141). Nevertheless, a recent review of development research 
confirms that this goal is as necessary as it ever was: 
The key message from all four research programmes has been the centrality of 
politics in building effective states and shaping development outcomes. It shows 
‘politics’ not as an abstract concept, but as an essential determinant of the 
Millennium Development Goals – that is, better educated, healthier, more 
prosperous people. The research has delivered this message in many ways. It 
provides evidence of politics as the ‘driver of change’ and as the ultimate 
cause of people’s security and access to justice. It shows how local the local 
political economy influences taxation, fragility and the ability of citizens to 
participate in their own development. (DFID, 2010:4, emphasis in the original) 
A similar conclusion can be found in a recent, comprehensive review of Dutch 
aid policy and performance. 
After all, aid is never innocent: it places countries in a dependent position and 
gives rise to all sorts of power politics in which individuals try to benefit 
themselves and their own people. (Van Lieshout, Wendt and Kremer, 2010:266) 
The fact that official aid for development and the dominant development 
narrative itself is a political instrument in a repertoire of international relations 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to a series of critical inputs to this work from:  Harry Boyte, Lucia 
Boxelaer, Mike Edwards, Georgina Gomez, Bert Helmsing, Remko Berkhout, Peter 
Konijn, Allert van den Ham, Marlieke Kieboom, Peter Knorringa, Monique Kremer, 
Jenny Pearce, Josine Stremmelaar. 
2 Following Bebbington et al (2008) a distinction is made between big ‘D’ 
development of societies as a whole over time and the little ‘d’ development 
associated with international aid and cooperation. 
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is hardly contested. Riddell (2007:398) contends that until aid is de-coupled 
from the systemic problems stemming from the bi-lateral interests of donor 
countries the quest for greater effectiveness will remain undermined.  Yet, this 
reality is masked by assertions of poverty as the guiding criteria for aid with the 
Millennium Development Goals acting as the public justification for the 
deeper real-politic of aid allocations and its volatility an unreliability (Cogneau 
and Naudet, 2007; Bulir and Hamman, 2008). Whichever way one approaches 
aided development, politics matters a lot. 
This article describes an ongoing effort to bring politics and socio-political 
processes into the core of development discourse. 3It details the substance of 
civic driven change (CDC) as a novel narrative recognising, but conceptually 
relocating civil society. The following section offers a brief re-cap of how civil 
society has been variously understood and the problems that such a situation 
has created. This background is followed by a review of how the concept has 
been selectively applied in and by the official aid system to generally produce 
apolitical outcomes. It is argued that mutually supportive forces are involved 
which operate as an interlocked system in international aid. A result, described 
in section three, is a search for a way out of the current civil society impasse 
which responds to the more complex layers of political arrangements 
associated with globalization, advances in communications technology and the 
nature of the uncertainties faced by all societies. A concluding section describes 
what needs to be done to better comprehend and demonstrate CDC as an 
additional lens in the analytic repertoire of development studies. This 
introductory broad treatment sets out the scope of what CDC is and has, 
potentially, to offer. As a work in progress, a finer grained analysis is part of 
future research plans and an anticipated series of publications. 
2 Civil society as a discourse 
Triggered by the implosion of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Asia and 
Central Europe in the 1990s,  the re-emergence of the notion of civil society 
into political theory and its contested meanings and interpretations are well 
documented and critiqued (e.g., Cohen and Erato, 1992; Hann and Dunn, 
1996; Deakin, 2001; Hodgkinson and Foley, 2003; Chambers and Kymlicke, 
2003; Edwards, 2004). In addition, narrow geo-historical origins of some two 
hundred years in western Europe and North America spurred debates on the 
concept’s broader international validity (e.g., Blaney and Pasha, 1993; Kumar, 
1993; Mamdani, 1996; Lewis, 2003) which have not produced a convincing 
outcome. In this sense, depending on your point of view, the search for a 
resolution of a civil society narrative has reached a dead end or remains an 
ongoing challenge. In either case, empirical study and resolution of contending 
positions is exacerbated by the difficulties of applying the concept to countries 
such as China and Vietnam which are adopting market economic principles 
                                                 
3 Here we borrow from Hickey (2009:142) in following his adoption of Mouffe’s 
distinction between politics as the practices, discourses and rules of the game required 
for social order, while the political stems from the issues and struggles between social 
groups for power and resources. 
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while maintaining socio-political configurations deeply rooted in communism 
(Howell, 1993; Howell and Pearce2001). 
It can be argued that civil society has been so variously understood as to 
be almost meaningless in terms of providing a coherent conceptual and 
empirical political-analytic framework. For example, the concept is used in a 
singular fashion, arguing that there is a ‘civil society position’ or a ‘civil society 
interest’, thereby ignoring those that disagree with this. A condition of multiple 
meanings is perpetuated because the alternative conceptualisations on offer are 
self-referential in terms of how civil society is defined and located in analysis of 
political processes and power relationships (Van Rooy, 1998).  This makes 
robust comparison and empirical validation somewhat illusory. Glasius (2010: 
1-2) illustrates alternative ways in which the civil society is understood, 
sometimes in: 
a number of quite different and sometimes contradictory normative 
connotations, stemming from different parts of its long intellectual history. 
Glasius provides five examples: 
Civil society as social capital: through frequent association with each other in a 
variety of networks, trust between citizens is built up through a virtuous cycle of 
repeatedly meeting each other’s expectations. This solves collective action 
problems and improves the well-being of the community and its citizens - a 
notion inspired by de Tocqueville and Putnam. 
Civil society as citizens active in public affairs: rather than just being producers 
and consumers, civil society denotes people’s willingness to give time and 
attention to engagement in public affairs for the common good. 
Civil society as non-violent and resisting violence: it constitutes the recognition 
that resolving conflict through non-violent means is preferable to the use of 
force, and engages in non-violent and anti-violent collective action. Inspired by 
Gandhi and peace movements. 
Civil society as fostering public debate: this sees civil society as synonymous 
with the public sphere. In this sphere, through the media and venues of public 
debate such as town hall meetings, citizens debate each other with proposals for 
the public good, and through these deliberations better policy proposals are 
formulated, which informs formal politics. Inspired by Habermas. 
Civil society as counter-hegemony: while civil society is in part a hegemonic 
project of designing and disseminating ideologies that justify individual and 
collective differences in power and wealth, this sphere also gives space to doing 
the opposite: formulating and disseminating ideologies that challenge the 
powerful and champion the marginalised, through cultural institutions such as 
the media, churches, associations or trade unions. Initially one creates one’s own 
counter-hegemonic institutions, but eventually the project is to ‘overwhelm’ the 
mainstream. Inspired by Gramsci.  (Emphasis in original) 
Glasius goes on to argue that a mix and match of these attributes and 
perspectives leads to different versions of civil society that satisfy neoliberal, 
liberal, radical and post-modern predispositions. This rendition corresponds to 
a debate which seems to be unable to advance a compelling theoretical 
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proposition about the role of civil society in the trajectories and outcomes of 
ongoing political evolution within, between and above nation states.  
Assistance from other disciplines, such as international relations, does not 
seem to offer much hope for reconciliation or coherence. For example, when 
comparing three ‘big visions’ of the future world (dis)order Richard Betts 
(2010) argues that there is no unequivocal sign of a global convergence 
towards western configurations of state-society relations and related internal 
distribution of power. Modernization does not necessarily equal westernisation 
and economics does not necessarily triumph over (cultural) identity and 
dignity. Consequently, it is unwise to assume that an uncontested version of 
civil society will arise from processes of globalization any time soon. 
Another problem is that the slant of these normative positions is one of 
civil society as naturally ‘good’ in the sense of seeking justice, fairness and 
some understanding of a collective good and collaborative problem solving 
that are all conducive to (re)establishing social order. The so called ‘non-civic’ 
part of civil society that also drives and act as protagonists in socio-political 
processes – oligarchic elites, terrorisms, corporate and drug cartels, human 
traffickers, sects or groups pre-disposed to violence, xenophobia and so on – 
seem to be ignored.  Yet their existence and influence on issues such as 
limitations on civil liberties (Sidel, 2004), regime corruption and the politics of 
immigration are patently clear.  Such forces in a ‘warts and all’ civil society and 
in development itself need to be better theoretically recognised and accounted 
for (Monga, 2008). 
The conceptual and normative ambiguities of civil society described above 
are compounded by the empirical messiness of the socio-political motives, 
relationships, structures, forms, functions and expressions of a polity as it 
exerts agency. Experience of multi-country research projects on civil society – 
such as the Johns Hopkins quantitative comparative study and the qualitative 
Civicus Civil Society index – show a struggle to both delineate and investigate 
configurations and socio-political conditions, processes and agents that are 
‘invisible’ to outsiders but very much visible to those involved (Biekart, 2008).  
This empirical difficulty is being exacerbated by the spontaneity and transience 
of collective action politics made increasingly possible by advances in 
communications technology where ‘everybody’ can be at the table (Shirky, 
2008).   
In sum, as currently pursued, civil society discourse is unresolvably too 
‘plural’ and its context-specific expressions too diverse to offer a prospect of a 
making an unambiguous contribution to political theory and action. In a world 
that is becoming more interdependent with states less able to solve more 
(super) wicked problems and dilemmas alone (e.g., Rischard, 2002; Levin, 
Bernstein, Cashmore and Auld, 2009)4, a civil society story will remain a useful 
but limited vantage point to adequately comprehend and explain the socio-
                                                 
4 Super wicked problems are wicked problems with additional characteristics which 
include: (a) Time is running out; (b) No central authority; (c) those seeking to solve 
the problem are also causing it; and (d) the value of solutions is discounted in non-
liner ways. 
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political processes involved at their inter-connected scales.  A more directly 
political approach is called for. 
For reasons set out next, a similar argument can be made for the low 
probability that the concept and realities of civil society will bring politics into 
the centre of development studies. 
3 The politics of  civil society and international 
development 
Prior to the era of civil society discourse, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) had been the principle non-market driven, non-state actor gaining 
prominence in development theory, policy and practice premised on their 
assumed comparative advantages (e.g., Brown and Korten, 1989). The 
subsequent global growth in numbers, scale and diversity since then makes 
general statements about NGOs problematic – there will always be specific 
exceptions in time and place that need to be recognised. With this caveat in 
mind, the advent of civil society into development analysis some twenty years 
ago involved twin processes of adjustment within the aid community. First, it 
was necessary to determine how exactly this concept would alter existing 
thinking about how change happens by whom. Second, was a challenge to 
incorporate NGO-ism5 into this evolving and, for donors, new way of 
modelling development while, at the same time, operationalizing ‘good 
governance’ objectives and mainstreaming the New Policy Agenda. 
Much intellectual effort was applied to the former challenge. Contending 
ideas about what civil society was and did in ‘big D’ development were 
identified in terms of their ‘small d’ equivalents (fn.2., Van Rooy, 1998; Pratt, 
2003). Others analysts took a more critical stance, pointing out the 
contradictions between the conceptual options on offer. With their increasing 
dependency on official aid, observers also questioned the willingness of NGOs 
to make hard choices between options under dominant conditions of neo-
liberalism (Eade, 2000; Howell and Pearce, 2001). Expectations about NGO 
roles in support of material improvement and democratization in post-Soviet 
countries tried to combine these twin processes of adjustment to new 
conditions (Clayton, 1994, 1996). A moment and potential arose for civil 
society thinking to bring a more directly political dimension not just to national 
development but to NGOs themselves (Clark, 1991, 1993) and, subsequently, 
transnationally (Clark, 2003; Taylor, 2004; Batliwala and Brown, 2006).  Some 
observers wondered if such an unanticipated shift in discourse with its multiple 
interpretations could re-invigorate an anticipation, from the nineteen seventies, 
that NGOs would offer an alternative, more politically ‘activist’ and 
progressive model of development thinking and practice (Fowler, 2006). In 
other words, could and would NGOs exploit the moment and re-grasp an 
opportunity to counter the social-welfare and participatory ‘voice’ bias of the 
                                                 
5 Following Hilhorst, (2003) NGO-ism is understood as a set of expectations, 
assumptions, vocabulary and performance metrics of public benefit meriting tax 
concessions that are associated with western non-profit organisations self-mandated 
to undertake development work. 
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official system towards NGO policy (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008:11-
15)? For reasons set out below, this did not happen to any substantive degree.  
Growing expectations about the political potential of social movements, rather 
than NGOs, is but one indication of this outcome (Ghimire, 2005). 
At a similar moment, the official aid system made – unsurprisingly - a 
relatively narrow selection between contenting theories of civil society in 
favour of those most consistent with liberal market democracy premised on 
negotiated processes of change in society (Riddell, 2007). This choice is 
illustrated, for example, in the remedial roles allocated to CSOs as part of 
structural adjustment policies (Lipton, 1991). Subsequently, the introduction of 
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) required NGOs to take on 
‘participatory’ functions that called for a more ‘enabling environment’ (World 
Bank, 2003). Sensitive to the ‘sovereignty constraint’ in international relations, 
alternative theories of civil society that embody political disputation and 
struggles for power were marginalised.   
Within this overall ideological template, donor policies towards civic 
society as organisations (CSOs) showed modest variation in the mix of 
concepts employed (Giffen and Judge, 2010). Depending on the donor country 
concerned, normative plurality allowed for greater or lesser accommodation of 
‘progressive’ NGOs. Over time, donor policy space opened up for inclusion of 
other types of entities. Faith-based groups, trade unions, and professional 
associations were recognised as member-based constituents of organised civil 
society with a developmental contribution to make. Be that as it may, the 
‘intermediation’ function of NGOs in and between societies remained the 
dominant character of what, in many aided countries, became understood as 
civil society.  Correspondingly, in equating NGOs with CSOs, regimes 
computed the latter as being of value when supplementing state social 
development efforts but with suspicion of non-service ‘political’ functions, 
such as advocacy.  A ‘backlash’ against NGOs at the United Nations signalled 
the discomfort of many (autocratic) regimes with CSOs gaining a bigger 
presence and influence in (inter)national bodies (Mohammed, 1997). 
More directly, NGO-ism served as a financing source to the relief 
complements of armed resistance movements, such as the Ethiopian Relief 
and Rehabilitation Association. They also acted as a ‘holding ground’ for 
political aspirants within the then prevailing single party political systems. It 
was tacitly understood that NGO-ism would and could be ‘political’ in serving 
a donor’s foreign policy imperatives, but could not be overtly recognised as 
such (Biekart, 2005). Thus, by and large, NGOs did not provoke an open 
debate on the politics of development and were criticised for simply aiding and 
abetting western interests. For example, protagonists across the NGO fault 
lines in the Fifty Years is Enough campaign against the World Bank speak to the 
different political positions in play. The mainstream NGO adoption of critical 
engagement towards such (inter-)governmental institutions may incrementally 
shift ideas and practices of official development institutions, but do not upset 
the prevailing neo-liberal perspective on civil society (e.g., World Vision, 1996).  
Looking back, the resulting conditions attached to public financing of NGOs 
for development activities – and the latter’s responses to such conditions – 
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point to a significant, but not exclusively, political-economy imperative for self-
sustainability that has mitigated against them bringing politics back in. 
Official conditionality towards aided CSOs has played out in many ways 
that lead to apolitical outcomes. First, it has discounted the significant diversity 
of inspirations, contending political forces and interfaces within civil society in 
favour of the service delivery and public accountability functions common to 
domestic non-profit organisations. As a consequence, an NGO choosing an 
alternative concept of civil society and other roles tends to self-exclude from 
direct support from official aid agencies. But, it also means that it is better able 
to mitigate against overly growth-driven organisational strategies which – in the 
name of the poor – would make them supplicants to donors that typically 
demand compliance with officially ‘approved’ technocratic development 
practices (Wallace, Crowther and Shephard, 1988; Wallace, Bornstein and 
Chapman, 2006). However, the proportion of official aid NGOs rely on has 
increased significantly over time.6 This suggests many NGOs have not chosen 
against seeking public finance for their work. This process leads to self-
restraint in adopting development theory or practice centred on politics. That 
is not to say, that NGOs are not politically aware or informed. But dependency 
on public finance, allied to risk aversion, predisposes to apolitical development 
practices – service delivery wins out over overt civic activism. 
Second, a predominantly service and market perspective on what civil 
society has to contribute to ‘small d’ development has been reinforced by 
applying the concept and language of a ‘sector’ with roots in the economics of 
comparative advantage. This ‘third sector’ is often portrayed as a harmonious 
sphere in which all the anomalies of the market and the state are compensated, 
while conflicts between interests and anti-social behaviour are ignored. The 
sector influence on identity is reinforced by the proposition that, as a sector, 
civil society can be ‘enumerated’ and its economic value computed (e.g. 
Salamon, 2010). Such a proposition and its effects on public policy negate and 
mask a civil society’s fluid, spontaneous and politically dynamic expressions 
seen recently in North Africa and the Middle East. Negotiation within this 
frame impacts on NGO self-understanding towards an economic rather than 
political perspective (Johansson, et al, 2010).   
As a consequence, treating oneself as part of a ‘sector’ relies on 
(accountability) logics of efficiency and effectiveness of outputs. These metrics 
can also foster identity ambiguity for NGOs whose theory of change is 
disposed towards a more progressive position on civil society and hence on 
themselves (Shutt, 2009). The portrayal of civil society as one constituent in a 
tri-sector society model serves to either de-politicise or to tightly frame 
discourse towards existing dominant definitions of reality.   
Fourth, as aided civil society, NGOs have often adopted an official 
development agenda focussed on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) as well as paralleling efforts at donor harmonization – the Paris 
Agenda on aid effectiveness (Booth, 2008). The absence of politics associated 
                                                 
6 Reliable figures on sources of NGO financing for development over time are 
unfortunately not available.  OECD/DAC statistics do signal twenty years of 
substantial increases to NGOs as a ‘sector’.  
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with these frameworks is readily observed. So framed, advocacy and lobbying 
are, for example, directed at reforming governance through public policy and 
respect for human rights. In parallel, organisational competencies required to 
demonstrate a tangible contribution to MDGs associate NGO professionalism 
with (business) managerialism and its metrics. This expectation reinforces a 
common internal/governance pressure for year on year financial growth. This 
stance is inherent to non-profits as an organisational type (Kanter and 
Summers, 1987). An NGO growth orientation also has origins in Caritas where 
monetary turnover is a proxy measure of success, which combines with a 
business logic and measures in a prerogative to sustain the organisation.7  
Together, these factors bind NGOs to a ‘follow the money’ political economy 
(e.g., Albertyn and Tjønneland, 2010). This imperative is seen in INGO 
organisational adaptations to match changes in resource distribution 
mechanisms, such as donor decentralization in funding decision making 
(Ronalds, 2010). Moreover, the introduction of market-inspired competitive 
bidding accentuates a commodification of an NGO development approach.  
Such allocation practices work against treating sustainable development as a 
co-produced socio-political processes between people who are (not) poor and 
those working in solidarity with them. This negation of people’s agency plays 
through the intermediation mechanism from North to South. 
As role models, in aid recipient countries western NGOs invoke an 
exogenous understanding and frame of reference for what civil society means 
and does. A common result is the emergence of a strata of local NGOs playing 
an intermediation role that are semi-detached from their own society in terms 
of norms, cultural; embedding and financing. The processes involved 
correspond more to social entrepreneurship than the spirit of voluntarism that 
NGO-ism used to portray. In itself, if honestly recognised, this outcome is not 
necessarily harmful, albeit difficult to sustain outside of foreign financing. But 
transmission by northern NGOs of the economic imperative to be self-
sustained, works against taking a politically-centred stance to change society. 
Calculated risk aversion is also involved, from which NGOs are seldom sites 
of mobilization of a followership with a political agenda. While they may help 
create supportive conditions and necessary capabilities, this type of action civic 
action is more likely to arise within endogenous forces of civil society. 
The forgoing does not imply that aided civil society has failed in its quest 
to save lives, help people escape poverty, protect the vulnerable, increase 
resources for non-state actors, introduce valuable innovations, influenced 
critical national and international policies, provided political refuge and form 
important international networks across civic actors. The point is that these 
achievements have not substantively advanced the political character and 
foundation for realising development outcomes. We are not arguing that civil 
society discourse as currently applied has lost its value or should be replaced. 
Rather we contend that the way civil society is understood and deployed within 
the context of aid is too limited and de-politicised to illuminate contemporary 
socio-political processes of change within, between and above nation states.  
                                                 
7 The technical difficulties of measuring development performance help perpetuate 
growth as a proxy for success and indicator of organisational health. 
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This state of affairs in aided development debate has not gone unnoticed. 
For example, a common NGO critique from the political left informs 
initiatives such as the World Social Forum (WSF) (e.g., Sen, et al, 2007; Bond, 
2010). Heated debates at WSF about a new economic model and new politics 
to remedy the failures of the liberal macro-economic and party systems are not 
common, however, in other international NGO forums. While acting as a 
counter-point to dominant narratives, WSF’s effects on centring politics in 
development discourse remain limited, in part because the whole notion of 
‘development’ is essentially contested. 
Another response is seen in initiatives that seek a more foundational 
political discourse by invoking human rights and citizenship (Gaventa, 2006).  
These advances tend to work with a political narrative of power associated 
with identity, participation and engagement between claimants and duty 
bearers. Such a point of entry has brought gains on many fronts, for example, 
in terms of insights about the nature of citizenship as a process of becoming 
rather than as a conferred legal status (Gaventa, 2006).8 In addition, common 
assumptions about the relationships between people’s voices and the 
effectiveness of articulation through different types of civic formation have 
been tested and challenged (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010). However, in doing so, 
concentration on the poor or excluded in relation to the state, has often been 
at the cost of: (1) the significance of citizen-to-citizen interaction within civil 
society that does not, a priori, lead to state ‘fragility’; (2) adequate attention to 
the uncivil dimensions of political agency; and (3) applying citizenship across 
all facets and institutions of a society as political project. Consequently, while 
drawing on this work, a further step was needed to establish a politically-
centred narrative of development – both with a big D and small d – which was 
not hampered by the selectivity of, as well as impasse in, existing civil society 
discourse. An initiative in this direction started some three years ago and is the 
subject of subsequent sections. 
Thirdly, though not adopting a civil society perspective - sponsored by 
bilateral donors, NGOs and a foundation - a recent initiative in a similar 
direction is the Development Leadership Programme (DLP) which: 
… addresses an important gap in international thinking and policy about the 
critical role played by leaders, elites and coalitions in the politics of development. 
This growing program brings together business, academic and civil society 
partners from around the world to explore the role of human agency in the 
processes of development. DLP will address the policy, strategic and operational 
implications of ‘thinking and working politically’ - for example, about how to 
help key players solve collective action problems, forge developmental coalitions, 
negotiate effective institutions and build stable states. (DLP, 2011) 
As will be seen, there are a number of findings from a review of case studies 
initiated by DLP that reinforce those which underpin civic drive change. 
                                                 
8 E.g., <www.ids.ac/drc> 
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4 Civic driven change: establishing a narrative 
What has emerged as a narrative of Civic Driven Change is the product of 
multiple discussions with some of the key Dutch development NGOs.9 The 
debate was driven by frustration at the lack of a self-determined and robust 
story with which to proactively shape how the Netherlands’ government was 
shifting its policy and practice of funding towards these private aid agencies. 
Over several political cycles, Dutch NGOs - working for 75 per cent or more 
with government subsidies - had questioned state-crafted understandings and 
positions on what was proposed as its NGO funding priorities, criteria and 
measures. The Ministry’s perspective increasingly reflected a utilitarian 
ascription of the role of civil society organisations with Dutch features of 
social welfare and ‘pillarization’.10 Investing in the search for a NGO/CSO 
narrative that would stand in its own right with its own ontology would be a 
valuable but uncertain effort worth taking. Following a grounded empirical 
methodology, a multi-disciplinary international team contributed to the 
emergence of a narrative centrally informed by civic agency (Fowler and 
Biekart, 2008). The following sections concentrate on CDC’s substance with 
selected illustrations and discussion of its theoretical location. It is a work in 
progress continuing to absorb feedback and critique.11 
4.1 The substance 
As the theoretical debate elaborated in the next section will demonstrate, civic 
driven change is a composite of pre-existing ideas and theories that are 
connected in a novel way. CDC can be described in terms of major 
propositions which translate into core elements. 
In order to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding and 
misappropriation of meaning at this stage of exploration, to describe CDC, we 
try to avoid using vocabulary commonly deployed in aided-development 
discourse. For example, in CDC terms, a participant is a citizen; participation is 
understood as civic agency; partnership is understood as a type of collaboration; and a 
project is treated as a case of civic agency, beneficiaries are constituencies. Bearing 
language in mind, the substance of CDC can be summarised in four basic 
propositions and eight elements. These constituent parts form a composite 
lens that can be applied to illuminate and understand human agency in 
processes of socio-political change. 
CDC propositions and constituent elements 
The individual and comparative case analysis underpinning CDC pointed 
towards four critical perspectives on how society can be conceived and its 
                                                 
9 These Dutch NGOs included Hivos, Cordaid, Oxfam-Novib, ICCO, SNV, Pax 
Christi, and Context. 
10 The term In Dutch is ‘verzuiling’ and alludes to physical pillars and is also a 
metaphor for a social structuration based on religious differences and a culture of 
tolerance for diversity. 
11 See footnote (1). 
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trajectories understood. It does so within a political framework provided by a 
nation state and its foundation on the concepts of citizenship and rights – both 
of which can be problematized. 
For CDC, the first proposition is that societies are regarded as ‘political 
projects’ where all walks of life contain various types of power, political forces 
and players. All people act politically in what they do or don’t do with their 
lives. This requirement for political centring in development thinking is 
stressed by Hickey (2009:142). Second, civic agency is the principle, normative 
unit of concern where history, context and power to define the situation matter 
(Goldfarb, 2006). Being ‘civic’ is understood to mean pro-social behaviours 
that respect difference between people and shows concern for the whole of 
society and not just for self (Fowler, 2009).12 Historically, countering uncivil 
behaviour – intolerance, discrimination, exploitation – are part and parcel of 
social structuration and a polity’s struggle with itself.13 That socio-political 
change in society is driven by both civic and uncivil agency needs to be seen 
and explained (Monga, 2008). A third proposition advances an appreciative 
position (Cooperrider, 1989) on social realities and on solving (wicked) 
problems which are understood as the unfulfilled imagination of a preferred 
situation. Living together inevitably generates dilemmas of collective action. 
Solutions call for imagination which co-defines a desired future situation which 
attracts the initiative, energy and agency of many – for example towards a 
sustainable ecology or a world without hunger (Ostrom, 2005). Fourthly, 
development is an inherently uncertain, complex, indeterminate process 
involving societal co-production for good or ill (e.g., Jervis, 1997; Beinhocker, 
2006). The drivers involved demonstrate conflict and contention as well as 
collaboration and sharing (Seabright, 2004).  
These propositions translate into a set of elements that are connected in 
different ways by existing bodies of theory and practice discussed in 
subsequent sections. The constituent elements of civic driven change have the 
following eight characteristics. In a sense they compositely ‘define’ what can be 
understood as civic driven change in their combination rather than in their 
singularities.   
(i) CDC relies on a rights-based understanding of political agency tied to 
citizenship that is simultaneously an individual and a collective identity. It 
is a defining relationship between a state and the polity. Legitimacy of the 
former calls for active, informed involvement by the latter. Where 
citizenship is not in play and the right to have rights is not honoured by a 
state - and there are a number of such situations - this latter condition 
needs first to be fulfilled. The ideological stance of North Korea towards 
its citizens, intolerance of public dissent in Turkmenistan , rule by 
autocratic regimes in the Middle East create conditions where active 
citizenship, be it allowed on paper, is denied in practice. 
 
                                                 
12 In Confucian philosophy, these two conditions are prerequisites for social order. 
13 The paradox of uncivil behaviour like street protests and insurrection for greater 
civil ends remains and can only be judged case by case in terms of outcomes. 
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(ii) CDC is not sector-bound. A CDC lens focuses on civic action for good 
or ill throughout all realms and institutions of society rather than a pre-
occupation with civil society that has been uncritically conceived as only 
working for public benefit. Put another way, CDC is not located in 
institutionally specific ways – it does not ‘belong’ to civil society. The 
recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and similar civic action elsewhere 
did not emerge from a ‘sector’ but from people in all walks of life that 
had experienced unemployment, giving bribes to stay in business, been 
compromised by security services to spy on their neighbours and family, 
experienced denial as political opposition and so on (Al Aswany, 2004). 
These micro politics combine to frustration that breeds radicalism and 
mass public dissent with an unlikely trigger of self-immolation. Such 
drivers of civic energy are not confined to the poor, marginalised or civil 
society as such but to the polity at large. 
 
(iii) CDC is open and scalable. Civic agency can be observed at any 
(aggregate) level of socio-political arrangements as well as horizontally 
through, for example, self-organised network relationships. It 
incorporates links from local to global change and back again as an 
iterative process. The political effects of combining civic agency through 
social media – again Egypt is an illustration, as was the Battle for Seattle 
at the World Trade Organisation Ministers meeting in 1999. While most 
visible when involving violence which draws media attention, such events 
show how what is politically micro and local can self-organise and scale in 
an organic ways nationally and internationally. The UN Global Compact 
for Business and the impact of transnational civil society on multi-lateral 
institutions are both examples of micro to macro scaling of civic agency, 
most acutely today with responses to environmental concerns. On a daily 
basis, changes in household behaviour towards domestic waste and its 
local processing ‘aggregate’ to a significant scale in environmental effects 
but offer no dramatic images that capture media attention. The 
propositions underpinning CDC are not self-limited in terms of the socio-
political span they can embrace and connect.   
 
(iv) CDC takes as a maxim the requirement for equity of political agency 
rather than equity of economic opportunity that informs dominant 
sector-based theories of change. Inequity in political agency is often 
captured in the notion of ‘exclusion’ from influencing power 
relationships. Typically, this results from a lack of capability for socio-
political engagement stemming, for example, from lack of organisational 
skills, inadequate knowledge of rights or of how decision making should 
work, or historical-cultural barriers to recognition as a political actor.  
Overcoming political exclusion may call for ‘uncivil’ behaviour. Naomi 
Hossain (2009) illustrates that ’rude’ claiming making on bureaucrats by 
poor women from socially excluded groups can make good against 
gender-based inequities in agency. 
(v) CDC looks beyond political structures and mechanisms, such as voting, 
to the historical processes and fundamentals of power accumulation and 
reproduction in a country and internationally. Politics in much of, for 
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example, Central America and Africa cannot be understood outside of the 
social fracturing caused by colonial penetration on whatever socio-
political arrangements were already in place (e.g., Herbst, 2001). What 
becomes political and why in whose favour over time is the exposed tip 
of an iceberg containing the deeper political forces that establish regime 
(il)legitimacy to be recognised but not to be interpreted on exogenous 
terms.   
 
(vi) CDC is sensitive to contention between endogenous and exogenous 
values, measures and processes. It distinguishes between aided and 
unaided change in society, which heightens attention to the role and 
power of outsiders in influencing socio-political and other processes, 
including how risks are distributed. The continual struggle for ‘authentic 
partnership’ is a well documented case of structural power asymmetry 
between aid actors. It is tied to money and assumed primacy of western 
‘enlightenment’ norms and predispositions towards tangible forms and 
products over relationships and intangible processes. This ‘values’ factor 
in aided change plays out strongly, for example, in prescription of 
institutional forms that simply will not work as outsiders intend. From 
comprehensive, comparative study of governance, Mick Moore and Sue 
Unsworth (2010:77) reach a supporting conclusion that: 
… donors need to turn the picture upside down, and develop new drawing skills. 
Unless they do so, they will not make the necessary investment in understanding 
local political dynamics, or make fundamental changes in their own organisation, 
values, attitudes and behaviour. In short, they will find it very difficult to resist 
the temptation to revert to the default position of viewing the world through an 
OECD lens. 
 
(vii) CDC recognises multiple knowledges that inform agency. It places trust 
in people’s own sites of knowledge-making which does not necessarily 
make them right, but is the well-spring for learning and self-capacitation.  
Farming systems in developing countries have long been sites where 
endogenous agricultural knowledge has gained a place alongside that of 
scientists to steer research investment. In South Africa’s Eastern Cape, 
on-the-street knowledge about local conditions is being captured and 
disseminated by a civic unit of a Newspaper’s journalists who set up shop 
in cafes and taxi ranks to directly hear what is bugging people on public 
issues. This daily monitoring of what people see municipalities are doing 
rather than saying is increasing bottom-up pressure to improve public 
services.14 
 
(viii) CDC recognises multiple types and locations of authority and governance 
and reactions to them. Authority over and accountability to a polity is 
located in different places for different things. For example, in signing up 
for Codes of Conduct and accountability charters, NGOs choose to cede 
some sovereignty in exchange for the collective value of complying with 
                                                 
14 http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/15/52619.html, accessed 2nd May 
2011 
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negotiated standards. In the European Union, elevation of political 
authority to a multi-country parliament while pursuing subsidiarity creates 
multiple new sites of governance that citizens interface with, but may not 
trust or understand. The World Trade Organisation can pass binding 
‘top-down’ judgments on the legal provisions of member states. The 
Kwanda project in South Africa illustrates how increases in a 
community’s capabilities for self-organisation can, from the bottom up, 
impact on many levels of public authority and policy. Examples include:  
changes to national approaches to community policing; changes in 
municipal conditions for liquor licensing; local enforcement of bar 
owners making food available with closing times that reduced incidents of 
rape.15 Poly centricity of governance is an increasing phenomenon that 
must be factored into viewing socio-political processes and the 
institutions involved (McGinnis, 2005). 
For any given context and socio-political process, each of these elements 
has its own scales, time lines, metrics and relative weights that are not static or 
immutable. Crudely framed, driven by inspirations to change domains of life 
within society, the CDC narrative is often about the politics of people moving 
From Clients to Citizens (Mathie and Cunningham, 2008). 
Domains 
CDC relies on the concept of socio-political domain centred on an imagined 
future of a ‘solved’ wicked problem. The idea of a domain has a strong affinity 
with Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of ‘social field’. These are understood as social 
arenas governed by distinctive values and approaches which emphasise their 
contested nature and the role of power in resolving contests, which are 
inherent to complex problems and social dilemmas.16 The significance of social fields 
is their detachment from any particular actor because they also exist as internalised 
mental elements or frames of reference or norms and cultural rules that co-
inhabit a person’s psycho-social construct, their habitus. In practical terms, a 
domain can be viewed as a substantive theme or desired future condition 
which holds society’s attention and attracts civic agency from any quarter.  
Examples are corruption as a non-sector specific uncivil behaviour; as is 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation; or social enterprise 
heralded in new forms of ‘low profit limited liability company (an L3);17 or 
mega-philanthropy as a composite of public and private, market and on-market 
principles with political effects in terms for example, of displacing state 
responsibility for the provision of public goods (Edwards, 2009). Informed by 
the imagined future of interest, domains supersede and selectively combine 
sectors. It can incorporate a polity’s transnationalism, now being accelerated by 
expanding internet access as well as net-enabled cell phone technology 
                                                 
15 www.seriti.org.za  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOnb4HRJTp0 
16 Social fields, are also found in complexity theory as forces operating and amenable 
to transmission over a societal distance.  Jung’s notion of collective consciousness of a 
society acts in such a way. 
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L3C 
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fostering social networks and user-driven media (Kanter and Fine, 2010).  
Figure 1. Illustrates the centrality of civic agency in the CDC narrative. 
FIGURE 1 
 CDC:  Illustrative framework 
 
 
Operating within families and often mediated through groups – for example, 
with religious or cultural ties - civic agency is motivated human energy with 
sources and drivers. A core task of a CDC lens is to assist in homing in on the 
origins, expressions and combining of civic energy with a sorting and filtering 
through socio-political processes and power to shape collective action and 
institutional responses to wicked problems, understood as selected domains of 
change.18 Simply put, to deepen and sharpen insights in why and how polity, 
politics and the political work as a society’s drivers. This challenge is described 
by the Development Leadership Programme in the following way: 
… if one is taking politics seriously, agency matters. By ‘agency’ is meant the 
choices, decisions and actions of individuals, groups and organizations and, in 
particular, their leaders and ’elites’. They have the potential to change things. Just 
as structures (institutions, rules, cultural norms) have ‘causal power’ (that is, they 
have power to influence what we do), so too do agents, though their causal 
power is different … (DLP 2010:5, emphasis in original). 
                                                 
18 We are grateful to Mike Edwards for this observation. 
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5 Civic driven change: theoretical location 
Civic driven change can be visualised in association with three ‘families’ of 
theory, some more closely related than others. One grouping is composed of 
theories associated with human and civic agency. Another concerns micro-
politics allied to collective action. A third set unpacks power. The composite 
nature of CDC brings these theories together in a coherent way bounded by 
the national state as a political project premised on the legitimizing existence of 
citizens.19 
5.1 Civic agency 
In a comprehensive treatment of the topic, Emirbayer and Mische (1998:963) 
argue that, in sociology, human agency has not been adequately addressed as an 
analytic category in its own right. In their view, agency is an interplay between: 
(1) past routine, experience and learning, energised by (2) images of a desired 
future situation, which is then (3) situationally-judged for achievability and risk, 
from which action may or may not be taken. Recent political upheavals in 
North Africa show how people’s risk calculus can change quickly and radically.  
In this reflexive sense, inaction is also an action. Results of (in)action feed into 
capabilities and future decision processes leading to a constantly self-
developing and updated condition of capability, appraisal and decision choice.  
At a given moment, any one of the three elements determining agency 
dominate, but all are present in agentic processes. For these authors, agency is 
thus defined as: 
…the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural 
environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the 
interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment both reproduces and transforms 
those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing 
historical situations. (Emirbayer and Mishe 1998:970)   
Thus, agency is one category in a total repertoire of human behaviour. It is co-
defined by orientation of personal or group action towards the stabilizing, 
enabling and constraining forces of social norms and values embedded in 
institutions (Walker and Ostrom, 2007). Agency can thus be interpreted as an 
investment in a future that people care about. CDC relates directly to the energising 
property of agency towards a future that can be ‘imagined’. This reflects is an 
appreciative position on social problem solving.   
However, agency itself is subject to human pre-dispositions towards 
others, themselves moderated by theories of the person.  In terms of the 
former, an ontology of CDC in terms of ‘civicness’ is described in the essay by 
Evelina Dagnino (Fowler and Biekart, 2008:28). 
… a critical task would be “to interrogate the ontological essence of civicness in 
relation to contending political projects, their actors and the material base from 
which they emerge and subsist. This assumes that there is an ontological essence 
                                                 
19 The problematic nature of citizenship as a concept and category that CDC relies on 
is substantially covered by the recent work of Institute of Development Studies and is 
not repeated. 
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of civicness. One challenge here is to think about what ideas could deserve this 
position without incurring in the reductive risks pointed out above. One 
possibility is to resort to ideas that share a conception of a basis for life in 
society. They run from Hannah Arendt’s common world, to Marshall’s 
“participation in the social heritage”; “a sort of basic human equality”; “the claim 
for recognition as full members of society”. They may include Patrick Pharo’s 
notion of an “ordinary civility”, a set of rules (formalized or not, written or not) 
that make social relations and life in society possible: rules for co-existence, built-
in in the intersubjective dimensions of social life, that only exist to the extent in 
which they are mutually recognized. What seems to be common in these views is 
a sort of a first basic preliminary layer of meaning in the civic: a disposition to 
live together in society, which sounds reasonable, largely shared and thus difficult 
to dismiss.20 
She goes on to caution against any homogenous view on what this means 
(ibid:29): 
Nevertheless, while equality establishes a connection between civicness, social 
justice, citizenship and democracy, it introduces grounds for differentiation and 
divergence.21 Thus, different understandings of these ideas, associated to 
different political projects, imply different directions to civic agency. It should be 
clear that this connection is one possibility among many others (such as religion, 
for instance). But all these different links - historically and contextually produced 
- shape the meanings of civic and civic agency: its contents, its subjects, its 
concrete forms, its locations. Recognizing this diversity, and the dispute that 
pervades it, is a crucial preliminary task.  
In CDC, the inter-subjectivity she speaks of in social relations is interpreted in 
terms of a ‘culturalist’ paradigm of the person. This is counterpoised to a 
dominant paradigm of the person: 
… which infuses public policy, politics, institutional practice, and much of civic 
and democratic theory and civic action is largely derived from positivist social 
science and science, conceiving the human person in relatively static fashion as 
an aggregation of consumer needs, wants, and appetites. ….“The contending 
culturalist framework conceives of the person in narrative terms, as immensely 
complex, dynamic, generative and “emergent,” full of differing and often 
contested impulses and interests. It is attentive to civic capacity building, 
cultivation of skills, habits, orientations, and environments which enhance 
people’s abilities for co-creation, or the ability to address common differences 
and to shape their circumstances across lines of bitter difference.22 
Of particular concern in CDC’s approach to agency is what it means to be 
‘civic’. Adopting a geo-historical reading locates the notion of ‘civic’ as a status-
bound normative behaviour tied to the rights and responsibilities of those 
                                                 
20 This underlies an increasingly recurrent category in Brazil and other countries: the 
distinction between a civil and a non-civil society, referring, for instance, to drugs 
trafficking and criminal organized groups for whom the physical elimination of others 
is seen as a current element of social life. 
21 Differentiation and divergence may also be present in the definition of equality 
itself. 
22 Clarificatory contribution of Harry Boyte to a review of a CDC research proposal, 
10, May 2010, mimeo. 
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governing city states. In Heater’s account (2004) the earliest references to 
‘civic’ are allied to the concept of citizenship associated with a socio-political 
status accorded within Spartan communities and the governance of Athens.  
The corresponding tasks, authority and accountability of citizenship were 
accorded to selected individuals – propertied elites exhibiting valour, virtue and 
commanding influence. Women, slaves, labourers and craftsmen were 
excluded from this rank. Exclusion was the norm and remains so in many 
authoritarian-ruled societies. Citizens were recognised as political beings with 
rights to wield the power required to protect and ‘justly’ oversee and govern 
the affairs of rural communities and of urban city-states. There was stringent 
attention to citizens properly discharging their mutual duties which called for 
particular ‘civil’ behaviour in terms of constrained self-interest for the overall 
good. That which emerged as ‘civic’ – a normative property of citizenship - 
included responsibility for the proper servicing and management of public 
areas and of investments and resources derived from the functioning of the 
whole populace. 
With an intervening history of western universalism, Hauguaard 
(1997:200) is at pains to remind us that ‘civic’ as conceived in CDC – concern 
for the whole and respect for difference – is not to be confused by or 
conflated with ‘civilisation’. He cautions against comparing ‘civilised’ and 
‘uncivilised’ societies because of the impossibility of appreciating the 
constraints under which they operate over time. In similar vein, a CDC lens 
must be cautious about applying normative features more widely than the 
minimum envisaged from the combination of ontology and histiography 
described so far. For CDC, this poses dilemmas of contextualisation, cultural 
relativity and positioning in terms of endogenous and exogenous values alluded 
to earlier. 
From a socio-psychological angle, being civic implies a state of self-
awareness or mindfulness about humanity and its place in nature. This 
condition may involve spirituality, theology, rationality and other frames of 
reference in a habitus of schemata and dispositions which co-inform attitudes 
towards others and towards power (Mwaura, 2008). In this vein, public debates 
about CDC note the importance of the ‘self’ in what civic agency means.  For 
example, taking to heart the idea of being a global citizen with corresponding 
responsibilities: 
… this could encompass a global citizenship outlook, which can be translated 
into civic actions such as ethical consumerism (consume less, buy fair trade, 
biological, seasonal and local produce), ethical producer-ism (corporate social 
responsibility and social business approaches), active citizenship (vote, be 
involved and engaged), ethical employee-ism (relate, take up 
responsibility).(Berkhout, et al, 2011:14) 
While this quotation is global in perspective, it actually involves civic agency 
confronted by many places where power within and over socio-political change 
plays out and need to be mediated and governed in one way or another.  CDC 
as conceived is sensitive to this dimension of societal change. 
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5.2 Micro-politics, collective action and the public-private 
divide 
It follows from this that thinking politically – and especially about the role of 
agency – requires us to focus on and understand the micro-politics of the 
phenomenon with which we are concerned. Understanding the structural and 
institutional contexts, and what is loosely called the ‘political economy’ is 
important, of course. But for working politically, there is simply no alternative to 
understanding, in detail, who the players are, what they do, where they come 
from, their organizational affiliations, networks, ideologies networks, ideologies 
and interests and the political dynamics of the issue or sector. Detailed political 
ethnography is needed. (DLP, 2011:5) 
This quotation reflects the significance of delving into the fine-grained nature 
of socio-political process, particularly the interface between civic agency and political 
society. As argued earlier, civic-driven change can be analysed at various socio-
political levels, from local to global. However, it is the local level where civic 
agency generally manifests itself most clearly and is, apparently, least complex.  
It is this level where individuals, as citizens, consumers, clients, or co-
producers take initiatives with public aims which shapes civic action. Goldfarb 
(2006), describes such processes as the ‘politics of small things’, that is routine, 
mundane practices led by ground-level social actors. When combined, aligned 
and energised, micro-politics can act as a fundamental political force which 
redefines the situation against prevailing interpretations championed by the powerful. The 
tenacity of protestors from all walks of life to recast and politically redefine 
Tunisia and Egypt is a potent example. 
Informed by social movement theory about actors, agency and how change 
happens, we ended up asking the wrong questions as to why the people have 
risen. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, was there an organised social movement? 
Certainly not: Did they have visible leadership? No. Did they have a massive, or 
at least significant following? Not in the conventional sense of a mobilised 
constituency. 
Our analytical perspectives failed to enable us to ‘see like citizens' and understand 
that people were overcoming barriers of fear and reaching breaking point. 
(Tadros, 2011) 
Micro initiatives can be of a very different nature, from engaging in a debate on 
climate change around the kitchen-table, to putting a smart phone-filmed video 
of a Teheran oppositional demonstration on You tube, to actually taking risk as 
a civic actor on the streets. Benford and Snow (2000) have argued how 
‘collective action frames’ are generated when initial initiatives come together 
and merge towards becoming movements with shared understandings of what 
needs to be changed. These are serious negotiations, often without mediation 
of formal groups or political parties. It is this breeding ground of informally 
negotiated, collective civic action where a CDC orientation is shaped, which 
therefore needs concrete underpinning. 
In a CDC narrative, theories of collective action are important. A 
particularly critical theoretical angle – signalled in Chapter 10 of the CDC book 
(Fowler and Biekart, 2008:177) – is a potential guiding philosophy of co-
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responsibility for the world as a global commons. Here the work of Eleanor 
Ostrom (2005) on the complexity of public action theory, and the contrary 
historical lessons for collective versus private ownership (Harvey, 2011) are 
likely to be pertinent to approaching wicked problems that often appear as 
social dilemmas: 
The term ‘social dilemma’ refers to a setting in which individuals choose actions 
in an interdependent situation. If each individual in such situations selects 
strategies based on a calculus that maximizes short-term benefits to self, 
individuals will take actions that generate lower joint outcomes than could have 
been achieved. (Ostrom, 2005:4) 
Olson’s proposition that individuals will act collectively to provide private 
goods, but not if it concerns public goods, was elaborated by zooming in on 
the community level, where these differences are less articulated (Boyte, 2008).  
The private role of citizens often seems to be linked to economic roles when it 
also can be broadened to include social and political ‘responsibility’. This in 
itself is an important debate about the line between ‘civic-driven’ and ‘profit-
driven’, which relates to interfaces between civil society and markets. Such a 
discussion is also linked to the problematic use of the notion ‘of ‘social capital’ 
in relation to empowerment (Harriss, 2002) which can shed light on the subtle 
shift in interpretation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ to focus on the real meanings of 
what ‘civic’ and ‘civic agency’ can imply for political change. This would 
include discussions about personal ‘risk’, strategies in the form of ‘political 
projects’ and public service-delivery aimed at ‘co-production’ at the local level 
in order to stimulate citizens’ capacity to engage. 
5.3 Power and empowerment 
Political discourse is about power. The IDS programme researching citizenship 
provides an accessible categorization and analytic entry point (Gaventa, 
2006:2). 
Power ‘within’ often refers to gaining the sense of self-identity, confidence and 
awareness that is a pre-condition for action. Power ‘with’ refers to the synergy 
which can emerge through partnerships and collaboration with others, or 
through processes of collective action and alliance building. Power ‘over’ refers to 
the ability of the powerful to affect the actions and thought of the powerless. 
The power ‘to’ is important for the exercise of civic agency and to realise the 
potential of rights, citizenship or voice. 
From a CDC point of view, this formulation is helpful but incomplete.  
Applying a power lens to socio-political processes needs to include theory that 
interrogates power as both individually socialised and embedded and actively 
constructed by interaction. This type of analysis spans from covert or hidden 
power to its more overt, institutionalised and transactional dimensions.  For 
example, Bourdieu exposes power deeply hidden with acculturated world views 
and resulting predispositions towards and interpretations of identity and life’s 
experiences (Navarro, 2007). The work of Lukes (2005) and others point to 
additional, progressively overt, expressions of power. One is the function of 
language to define the parameters of thought and nature of knowledge.  
Language also dictates public and private discussion, communications and 
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messages, typically favouring existing systems of dominance. A further 
influence of language is to label ‘reality’ in ways that manipulate or mislead 
peoples’ predispositions or cause them to misrecognise their ‘objective’ 
interests (Lukes, 2005:149). Further, Haugaard (1997) demonstrates how 
structuration of power co-determines processes of (political) inclusion and 
exclusion and the rules of the game in socio-political arrangements and 
engagement. Finally, many authors treat physical coercion and force as, often, 
the most visible manifestation of power upon which – in the Weberian sense – 
states enjoy a defining monopoly. To fully interrogate social arrangements with 
their political processes, a CDC lens should draw on comprehensive theories 
and articulations of power as process and as empirical, practical expression. 
By way of illustration, Table 1 combines both ways of appreciating the 
qualities of power as an individual, collective and transactional phenomenon 
that can be empirically investigated, often in terms of civic agency capabilities 
and outcomes (Fowler, 2009). The table signals a bias towards power as an 
interactive property that is collectively generated applied in collective action 
found in a closer cluster of theories to CDC and problem solving. It is a first 
consideration of what a CDC power lens would focus in any chosen domain 
that will undoubtedly require refinement through research on practical 
application. 
TABLE 1 
 Power from a Civic Agency Perspective 
Power 
expressions  
Power 
Within 
Power With Power To Power Over 
Power processes     
Socio-
psychological 
forming 
Empowering 
acculturation 
and 
socialisation 
Associating for 
public action 
Selecting and 
living a self-
determined 
identity 
Assertion in 
society as a 
personal and joint 
political project 
Controlling 
Language 
Applying 
critical 
interpretation
s 
Creating a 
shared 
vocabulary 
Imposing or 
challenging 
discourses 
Diversifying and 
gaining access to 
information 
Controlling Rules Knowing and 
asserting 
rights and 
interests 
Negotiating 
collective 
outcomes 
Imposing or 
challenging 
exclusion 
(Co-)determining 
conventions, laws 
and policies 
Applying 
coercion 
Questioning 
expectations 
of self-
compliance 
Adopting 
protective 
collaboration 
Opposing 
unaccountable 
authority 
Just use of public 
instruments of 
physical force 
Allied to power categories are theories of empowerment which link CDC 
to a family of ideas associated with an ‘activist’ reading of socio-political 
change. Drawing on the renewed interest for empowerment by liberation 
theology and feminism in the 1970s, CDC has been inspired by the work of 
Friedmann (1992) who has criticised the neo-liberal use of empowerment.  He 
theorised poverty as the lack of access to social power, and pointed out that 
constraints were put on collective self-empowerment by tendencies to 
personalise empowerment strategies and reduce the attention for tackling 
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structural conditions causing poverty. Despite this weakened use of 
‘empowerment’, the concept remains very relevant for CDC especially when 
the meaning of power is further unpacked in ways described above. 
The central idea is to counter the disempowering effect of ‘internalised 
powerlessness’, which had been flagged by Fanon (1986), Foucault (1987), and 
Freire’s (1974) ‘critical consciousness’ , as well as several feminist authors 
(Rowlands, 1995; Mies & Bennholdt-Thomsen,1999). They point at the danger 
of stripping power from its transformative quality.  Indeed, (civic) agency is a 
tool for targeting disempowering structures. In this vein, a CDC narrative 
combines toward a theory of empowerment beyond ‘participation’ to a 
developmental democracy emerging though active engagement of the polity 
which reinforces both citizenship and the state as an accountable and effective 
bearer of legitimate authority. 
6 Concluding remarks 
This article responds to an enduring observation that, as a discipline, 
development studies is incomplete in the sense that politics as process and the 
political as substance have remained marginal. Recent analysis of development 
research continues to argue the case for bringing politics back in. We do so 
through a critical conclusion that twenty years of civil society discourse has not 
realised its potential to make the political central. While still of use for 
examining societal change, a civil society for understanding development needs 
to be ‘re-located’ and refined to sharpen and deepen the political contours and 
dynamics involved. Civic driven change is a way of doing so.  The core of the 
CDC lens, also identified by others, is located in the notion of civic agency as 
an empirical category. 
  Civic driven change is a work in progress. To date are three years of 
public exposure through publications, presentations and dedicated events with 
encouraging and critical results. This paper is a further step in testing the 
potential significance of a CDC narrative in current debates on how to better 
comprehend and act towards an era of greater political uncertainty, which is 
allied to a global inability to redress complex issues facing societies everywhere.  
Critical appraisal by others is invited and will be needed to home in on 
strengths and weaknesses.  
Irrespective of what this invitation produces, experience to date signals 
areas where attention is required. A central challenge is to further explore the 
ontology relied on as a source of imagination-driven civic energy where 
complex human drivers of reproduction, identity and meaning are likely to be 
in play (Fowler, 2007). Another issue is to ‘reconcile’ the normative premises 
of civic agency with endogenous norms and values. The supposedly 
ontological roots of pro-social behaviour remain open to contextual 
interpretation that has to be dealt with conceptually and methodologically. A 
second challenge is how to make CDC-illuminated processes visible in terms 
of knowledge and inspiration. This requirement is particularly tricky when 
interventions, aided or otherwise, are not in play. In effect it requires exposing 
and communicating about underlying forces that inhabit daily practices and 
relations that drive the socio-political factors in domains of concern. In turn, 
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this calls for practical ways to understand and delineate what a domain 
involves. Attention is also called for in terms of the moral dilemmas of 
applying uncivil means – such as public disobedience and confrontations with 
authority and between social groups – to achieve civic outcomes. Finally, an 
issue remains about what, if anything, CDC can contribute to the generally 
unsatisfactory state of effectiveness with international aid. If aid as currently 
envisaged and applied is too seldom able to support endogenous civic agency 
without undermining it, can a CDC perspective assist in revising development 
practice towards a better and more honest appreciation of power and the 
limited role of outsiders? 
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